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Abstract 
This essay is aimed at thematising the topic of post-truth in the ‘post-democrat-
ic’ constellation. From this perspective, it firstly illustrates contents and features of the 
broad concept of post-democracy, therefore analysing both the issue of the crisis of 
democracy and the impact of contemporary neoliberal platform capitalism on these 
process. Hence, it addresses the related topics of new technologies and changes in po-
litical communication, along with the unfolding of the neo-populist phenomenology. A 
number of concluding meta-theoretical reflections on the relationship between democ-
racy, knowledge and political representation are also developed. 
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Resumen 
Este ensayo tiene como objetivo tematizar el tema de la posverdad en la constelación 
‘posdemocrática’. Desde esta perspectiva, en primer lugar, ilustra los contenidos y las 
características del amplio concepto de posdemocracia, luego analiza tanto el tema de 
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la crisis de la democracia como el impacto que el modelo de capitalismo neoliberal 
contemporáneo tiene sobre estos procesos. Por lo tanto, aborda los temas relacionados 
con las nuevas tecnologías y los cambios en la comunicación política, junto con el de-
sarrollo de la fenomenología neopopulista. También se propondrán, como conclusión, 
una serie de reflexiones metateóricas sobre la relación entre democracia, conocimiento 
y representación política. 
Palabras clave 
Posdemocracia, neopululismo, posverdad, esfera pública.
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Introduction
One of the most influential concepts developed within the political theory debate 
over the last two decades, has certainly been the term “post-democracy”. Indeed, in 
2003, the political sociologist Colin Crouch devised an interpretative category to read 
democracy changes which would soon become a ‘paradigm’. He illustrated how, along a 
democratic trajectory, democracies first followed a developmental path during the XX 
century, then, since the 1990s, they have started to decline as regards the content and 
scope of citizenship rights and participatory practices, returning1 to the XIX century 
starting point of democratisation development, characterised by an elitist society, weak 
on citizens’ rights and expectations. 
The philosopher Rancière also uses the same term for a similar diagnosis, name-
ly that contemporary XXI century democracies have lost their rootedness in popular 
sovereignty, having reduced themselves to the ordinary ‘technocratic’ “administration 
of things”, to quote the Sant-Simon dictum. Similarly, another influential scholar, Oake-
shott, maintained that democracy is being fed by two kinds of politics, namely the poli-
tics of scepticism and the politics of faith. Whilst the former entails the development of 
democracy within institutions, the rule of law and the pragmatic governing of collec-
tive life, the latter entails mobilisation of popular enthusiasm, direct participation and 
a “quest for increased power to accomplish it, and confidence that such power can be 
safely entrusted to human beings” (Canovan, 1999, p. 8). The balance between the two 
is deemed to be the ‘right way’ for democracy to flourish and develop.
From this perspective, Margaret Canovan, one of the most influential scholars on 
the topic, renames these definitions of democracy as ‘redemptive’ and ‘pragmatic’ and 
maintains that democracy can be better defined as a double-face regime, considering 
not only that the redemptive and pragmatic faces are opposed but also that they are 
interdependent. It is within this spectrum that the crisis of democracy is unfolding 
today, since the ‘neo-populist’ wave seems to challenge the negative technocratic ver-
sion of the ‘pragmatic’ face of democracy, whilst the balance between the two faces 
seems to move back and forth erratically. Indeed, the technological revolution has had 
a deep impact on the day-to-day functioning of democratic processes, understood as 
government by public opinion (Urbinati, 2014), in a contradictory way. Expected to 
increase the quantum of rationality and knowledge within the democratic process, it 
1 The historical comparison has been formulated not to envisage a strict similarity but in order to capture both the signifi-
cance of the ongoing deep transformations and the democratic ‘decline’ in contemporary democracies.
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ended up introducing emotional elements and irrationality within this very process, 
causing what is regarded as the post-truth syndrome or post-factual democracy, in 
terms that we shall clarify further (D’Ancona, 2017; Engesser,Ernst,Esser & Büchel 
2017). 
Here below, I will address the democratic crisis issue in three fundamental analytical 
steps. Firstly, we will thematise the main accounts of the ‘crisis’ developed within po-
litical theory and the most recent political sociological debate. Then, I will analyse the 
emergent features of the neo-populist wave, not only as far as the transformation of the 
political landscape is concerned – namely the map of contemporary political cleavages 
which have undergone deep changes – but also as regards the structural transformations 
of capitalism strictly connected with the spread of the new technologies, as well as its 
relationship with democracy and its ‘regime of (post)-truth’. In this vein, I maintain that 
these changes, from the Fordist-Keynesian constellation to the bio-capitalist and digi-
talised economy, hugely influence both forms and substance of democracy. The third 
analytical element pertains to meta-theoretical reflections on these transformations, as 
far as the relationships between democracy, knowledge and political representation are 
concerned (Fumagalli, 2011). 
The Crisis of Democracy, Theories of the Crisis and the Post-
democratic Account: Setting the Theoretical Landscape
The “democratic paradox” of recent decades, consisting of the contextual celebra-
tion of the global diffusion of democratic regimes along with the announcement of 
the crisis of democracy as both a ‘technology of government’ and a model of political 
constitution (Agamben, 2010), has defined the perimeter of both the theoretical and 
political debate on representative democracy (Bobbio, 1995; Zolo, 1992). It is worth 
trying first to unpackage the various accounts and interpretations of the concept of the 
crisis, considering how the “crisis of democracy” is deeply embroiled in the various 
‘narratives’ which represent the crisis itself. From this perspective, the post-demo-
cratic diagnosis formulated by Colin Crouch allows us to observe a long-term pro-
cess “whereby all the institutions of liberal democracy survived and functioned, but 
where the vital energy of the political system no longer rested within them, but had 
disappeared into small private circles of economic and political elites” (Crouch, 2019, 
p. 126). The author then specified that 
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for democracy to be flourishing […] movements emerging from the population at 
large, unprocessed by the elite’s political managers, must from time to time to be 
able to give the system a shock, raising new questions that elite would sooner not 
discuss. I mentioned three movements that had been still capable of doing this in 
recent years: feminism, environmentalism and xenophobic populism. What I did 
not anticipate was that the lead would be taken by the last of these to a massive 
extent.
In other words, while there seems to be agreement among scholars about the diag-
nosis of post-democracy and the impact of the transformations of capitalism, namely 
the reduction of welfare policies, the crisis of political parties, along with deep chang-
es in political representation mechanisms, doubts persist about the prognosis, namely 
about the possible reactions and remedies which could ensue. Whilst social movements, 
and feminist and environmental movements in particular, were expected to counteract 
the elitist, technocratic version of XXI century democratic regimes, as Crouch in par-
ticular maintains (and, similarly, as one of the main scholars in social movement studies 
such as Donatella della Porta has testified) (Della Porta, 2015), conversely it seems to 
be neo-populism gaining centre stage in opposing the “sceptic”, technocratic, ‘elitist’ 
face of democracy. Certainly, the global recession bursting onto the scene in 2007-2008, 
and the unfolding of austerity measures and the social disease which followed, brought 
a broad wave of global protests – in 2011 – in various countries, but also a cultural 
backlash of xenophobic, conservative and neo-populist movements. Thus, two different 
waves of protest manifested themselves in the aftermath of the global recession, devel-
oping the neo-populist wave, wherein scholars distinguish two different strands (Dia-
manti & Lazar, 2018)2, namely right-wing populism and its left-wing version (Anselmi, 
2017; Moffit, 2016). 
It is worth developing an overview of the main accounts formulated within the dif-
ferent ‘narratives’ about the crisis of democracy starting with some preliminary con-
siderations. Regarded as a mass-political regime, representative democracy has been 
depicted alternatively as ineffective, incomplete, too demanding or not demanding 
enough on the normative ground, according to the different ‘notions’ of representa-
tive democracy, namely the liberal model of political representation, born in the age of 
2 For an account of leftist social movements and parties such as, for instance 15-M and Podemos in Spain or Corbyn in 
Great Britain, Sanders in the USA, and the movement Five Stars in Italy (whose political collocation within the leftist do-
mains seems to be at least contending), see Diamanti & Lazar (2018).
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modern revolutions, the elitist and neoclassical Schumpeterian democratic model, or 
the social-democratic Welfarist version, within which broader forms of political par-
ticipation were achieved up to the 1970s (Held,1997; Lo Schiavo, 2014; Palano, 2012).
However, since the 1970s, two main accounts of the crisis of democracy, which be-
came one of the main debate topics in that period, have been formulated by scholars. 
These are the “conservative” diagnosis elaborated by the Trilateral Commission (Cro-
zier, Huntington, Watanucki) in 1975, and the “progressive” interpretation of the “sys-
temic crisis” of the political rationality of the democratic state insofar as its functions 
of reproduction of capitalism were to be reconciled with “democratic” and Welfarist 
performance (Habermas, 1973). Thus, the conservative diagnosis (which functioned 
as a self-fulfilling prophecy) formulated by the Trilateral Commission, classified the 
social movement waves of protest since the end of the 1960s, as the manifestation of 
an overload of participatory democracy and as a radical challenge to the integration 
processes that democratic political systems as such were expected to perform (Mast-
ropaolo, 2011). 
To clarify that point it is possible to observe how, within the framework of the cold 
war order, the Liberal-Welfarist representative western democracies had institutional-
ized and widened social citizenship within “real” democratic regimes. A specific Wel-
farist economic constitution that contributed to the development of legitimacy and 
trust within western societies has been targeted by a profound process of reconfigu-
ration of economic rationale, namely from the Keynesian regulation of economics to 
monetarist and neoliberal rules. Thus, spending cuts and surveillance of inflation rates, 
the reduction of tax revenues and the lowering of the redistributive effects of fiscal bur-
dens, have been implemented within the framework of neoliberal policies (Lo Schiavo, 
2014; Moini, 2016). 3 
A sort of “anti-egalitarian mutation” of representative democracies has taken place 
over the last three decades, reducing the substantial legitimacy of contemporary de-
mocracies (Urbinati, 2013). As far as the impact of the economic “crisis” is concerned, 
insofar as it has been considered a catalyst of the social problems caused by the neo-
liberal restructuring of economic regulation, what seems to be theoretically needed is 
to analyse the extent to which the crisis can be considered merely the result of casual-
ties in financial market gambling or rather if it can be better grasped as the structural 
3 In other words, it is possible to say that the ‘name’ of the crisis of democracy is that of the hegemony of neoliberal ‘ideo-
logies’, techniques of government, forms of knowledge – according to the analytical view of Foucault, who saw power as 
always deeply intertwined with knowledge and models of ‘governing’; see Lo Schiavo (2014); Moini (2016). 
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effect of the profound process of ‘neoliberalisation’ of the market and social relations. In 
fact, the “principled belief ” of market competition seems to have become a widespread 
normative assumption within globalized societies. In this vein, the long-lasting global 
economic recession of 2008 can be considered as both the triggering event of populist 
distrust toward democratic representative institutions or rather as one of the main caus-
es of the populist syndrome in itself. 
It is worth underlining here that the critical account of the post-democratic inter-
pretation of the crisis of democracy seems to corroborate the latter hypothesis. It is also 
worth highlighting here that, in a recent highly influential contribution, Ronald Ingle-
hart and Pippa Norris have clarified in which terms we can interpret the relation be-
tween the economic crisis and a deep political cultural transformation of contemporary 
democracies along with the consequent unfolding of global neo-populism. According 
to them, we are witnessing “the silent revolution in reverse”, that is a cultural backlash 
which has diverted western democracies from post-materialistic values (which put em-
phasis on freedom of expression, environmental protection, gender equality, and toler-
ance of gays, handicapped people, and foreigners) to a conservative, if not xenophobic, 
populist and authoritarian orientation. As the two authors specify,
we may be witnessing a shift in political cleavage comparable to that of the 1930s, 
which saw the rise of Fascism, on one hand, and the emergence of the New Deal 
and its West European parallels on the other hand. The reaction against rapid 
cultural change and immigration has brought a surge of support for xenophobic 
populist parties among the less secure strata. But rising inequality as also pro-
duced an insurgency on the Left by politicians like Bernie Sanders […]. So far, 
emotionally-charged cultural issues cutting across economic lines have hindered 
the emergence of a new coalition. But both the rise of populist movements and 
the growing concern for inequality reflect widespread dissatisfaction with existing 
political alignments (Inglehart & Norris, p. 452). 
The present wave of populism, renamed neo-populism, differently embodied in dif-
ferent countries, at least presents some recurrent elements that allow us to recognize 
a sort of minimum common denominator of the contemporary populist syndrome. 
Firstly, the paramount reference in political discourse to the “people” as the source of 
democracy, neglecting any form of intermediate organization between the people itself 
and the leader who is able to interpret and manifest the will of the people as a whole; the 
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verticalization of political space, which is no longer designed on a horizontal axis (that 
is on the contraposition between the Left and the Right), since it manifests the contrast 
between elites and the people, the powerful and the powerless. The refusal of cultural 
diversity and xenophobic manifestations against immigrants regarded as scapegoats in 
the face of the huge social problems, the manifestations of populism from above – ac-
cording to some scholars who have identified as neo-populist the politics of some con-
temporary political leaders (from Trump to Macron, to Renzi, Salvini and the Five star 
movement, Cameroon, Orbàn even with some differences between them) – are part and 
parcel of this syndrome (Anselmi, 2017; Moffit, 2016). The crisis of the role of political 
parties within representative democracies on one hand, and the transformations of po-
litical communication in social media on the other, along with the ‘structural’ impact 
of the economic crisis, are deemed to have contributed to the unfolding of the current 
populistic wave (Mair,2016; Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 2018; Sustein, 2017).
Neo-populisms, Bio-hypermedia, Post-truth and the Public 
Sphere
This analytical account begins with an overview of the main characteristics of the 
current neo-populist waves, regarded as the main symptoms envisaged within the 
worst-case scenario of an irreversible crisis of representative democracy, or rather as 
the manifestation of deep transformations. The recurrent usage of the prefix ‘neo’ before 
the term populism in recent political debate testifies not only to a revamping of the old 
phenomenon of XX century populist parties, but also the emerging of new forms of 
populism in the XXI century. 
Thus, although elements of continuity in the constitutive components of the pop-
ulist syndrome have been recognized, new features of populism as a ‘political style’ 
have emerged, showing a sort of ‘elective affinity’ between this new wave and the 
impact of new media in political communication (Demata, 2016; Waisbord, 2018). In 
this sense, at least conceptually, an element of continuity is given by the composed, 
complex, contradictory and contested configuration of populism as a socio-political 
phenomenon, which has been pictured by scholars as a slippery concept, or rather a 
fuzzy concept, also recognizable as a ‘constellation’ or ‘configuration’ of elements in 
a Weber and Eisenstadt conceptual lexicon (Anselmi, 2017). Regarding changes, it is 
possible to identify a specific “populist communicative ideology”, articulated in these 
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dimensions: an appeal to ‘the people’ as “a catch-all expression that politicians use, ir-
respective of their political affiliation, to unite the electorate” (Mazzoleni & Bracciale, 
2018, p. 4). Other elements, such as “attacking the élite” since the concept of populism 
is built on anti-elitism and anti-establishment stances” (2018, p. 6), which also implies 
“ostracising the others”, that is developing a narrative “based on the dangerous others 
concept that targets a common enemy within groups of population that are stigma-
tised and excluded from ‘the people’” (2018, p. 4). 
Based on these considerations, here below we will first account for the main char-
acteristics of populism and neo-populism, then we will try to ascertain the nature of 
the nexus between neo-populism and new media. In this framework, our observations 
will also draw on the literature that analyses the impact of platform capitalism, namely 
the structural dimensions of contemporary capitalism as it deeply affects the various 
social domains and ‘lifeworld’. Indeed, ‘bio-hypermedia’ is one of the most influential 
neologisms diffused in the contemporary lexicon unfolding since the fourth industrial 
revolution has deeply transformed contemporary societies. 
Bio-hypermedia is the conceptual term devised by assembling the concept of bio-
politics (Foucault, 2005)4 and hyper-media, the latter being considered as the epitome 
of the paramount influence of new technologies on societies. The hyper-connecting 
and ‘wearable’ technologies that then become parts of our own bodies, subjecting us 
to multisensory perceptions as real and virtual dimensions’ merge, extend and amplify 
emotional stimuli and change the way we interact and communicate (Griziotti, 2018). 
According to Han, not only a biopolitical account of this new human condition pro-
duced by the interfacing and intertwining of humans and machines, but also a more 
proper “psycho-political” (Han,2016) interpretation of this new ‘reality’ may clarify the 
revolutionary impact of these new technologies on everyday life. In this vein, techno-
logical and capitalistic changes have to be read conjointly and conceptualized. 
Platform capitalism is the new paradigm of XXI century capitalism, which is also 
regarded as the product of its financialization, that since the 1990s has become more in-
fluential than production; new technologies have fostered these transformations, which 
in turn affect the organisation of labour (Fumagalli, 2018). In other words, post-modern 
capitalism, which is based on the information economy, is undermining the fordist model 
of work: the creation of value no longer depends on (or not so much) the exploitation of 
4 This conceptual term can be considered one of the most influential if not paradigmatic expressions within the contempo-
rary social sciences lexicon. In fact, Foucault identified this term to pinpoint the nature of power and politics in modernity; 
see Foucault (2004a; 2004b).
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traditional workers’ subjectivity and its form (wage labour), whilst a new kind of worker 
is emerging, namely the ‘knowledge worker’. Neoliberal post-modern capitalism has 
found the new oil for the capitalist accumulation of the XXI century: data mining, ma-
chine learning, the algorithm economy, big data; thus, platform capitalism constitutes 
the new capitalistic ‘structure’. 
The process of digitalization and datification has made the engineering of everyday 
life possible; today there is no area of our digitally-mediated existence that is not the 
result of an algorithmic calculation (2018)5, from social networks on Facebook to rec-
ommended products on Amazon, from personalized advertisements to short-cuts to re-
turn home from work on Google maps. What matters more here is the political impact 
of these technologies and their “neo-populistic” effects on political communication and 
political lexicon. There are multiple effects to be taken into account. Firstly, it is worth 
considering what, according to the literature, are the main features of populism and 
of neo-populism. No simple account can be given, due to the complex, composed and 
contested ‘nature’ of populism itself. 
To put it simply, it is possible to say that scholars recognize populism as made 
up mainly of: “a) the existence of two homogeneous units of analysis [namely] “the 
people” and “the elite”; b) the antagonistic relationship between people and elites; c) 
the idea of popular sovereignty; d) the positive appreciation of the people and the 
denigration of the elite”  (Stanley, 2008, p. 102). These have been recurrent elements of popu-
lism waves since the second half of the XIX century, namely in the United States and 
in Russia6, whilst at least a part of the history of the democratization processes in the 
long run has been characterized by the quest of the people to be included in the public 
space. Thus populism, meant as “populist democracy” (Canovan, 1981) is part and 
parcel of the history of democracy. From this perspective, the historical experience of 
popular mobilisation with Peronism in Argentina, exemplifies this component of the 
populist phenomenology. 
5 By definition, by algorithm we mean a set of mathematical rules and procedures aimed at transforming a given input into 
a specific output; an actual assessment or decision process, performed according to a set of explicit rules. Each algorithm 
is the result of a human modelling of a problem to be solved and of the context in which it is situated; on this topic see 
Fumagalli (2018), Per una teoria del valore-rete, in Gambetta D. (a cura di), Datacrazia, cit., pp. 46-64.; Griziotti G. (2018), 
Big emotional data, in D. Gambetta (a cura di), Datacrazia, cit., pp. 70-91.
6 Populism first appeared in Russia in the XIX century. It was the political organisation Zemlja Volija (Land and Freedom) 
to connect the mobilisation of student movements, peasants, to oppose the tsarist regime. In the same period, that is during 
the second half of the XIX century, People’s Parties were born in the USA as an expression of rural society opposing the 
industrial elites of the West Coast. It is possible to consider well beyond this brief account the analyses of Damiano Palano, 
(2016). 
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Recent accounts on neo-populist manifestations, appearing in the theoretical de-
bate, illustrate the xenophobic, authoritarian orientations of political parties, which 
draw on the cultural backlash against post-materialist values, as Inglehart and Nor-
ris explain (2017). Conversely, there is also a ‘leftist’ interpretation of the quest for a 
revamped popular sovereignty against supranational, intergovernmental, capitalistic, 
elitist and neo-colonial power such as the South-American “pink wave” of leftist gov-
ernments (from Evo Morales to Lula, to Kirchner in Bolivia, Brazil and Argentine) or 
Bernie Sanders in the USA and Corbyn in Great Britain. Being considered the epitome 
of the neo-populist wave, two main events in recent years have marked the recent po-
litical history of (neo)-populism. The case studies of Trump’s election in the USA and 
the Brexit referendum in Great Britain have given rise to an astonishing number of 
analyses in scholarly debate, both in political theory and sociology. What has mainly 
been highlighted relates to the impact of social media and social networks in political 
communication, in that they seem to embody the new post-truthful physiognomy of 
the (former) Habermasian public sphere. 
A series of concepts exemplify the conceptual nexus we are addressing: there seems 
to be an elective affinity between post-truth and populism, which in turn derives from 
the structural transformation of the public sphere produced by the impact of social 
media and social networks. The latter shape a process of fragmentation and radicali-
sation of the “publics” participating in the political debate and forming public opinion 
within the public sphere; a transformation that, in turn, can be brought back to the 
impact of digitalized capitalism (Fumagalli, 2018). To clarify that point here, it is pos-
sible to see how “the current ‘populist moment’ brings up important questions within 
the scholars’ community. Populism calls into question the fundamental principles of 
democratic communication, namely the need for fact-based, reasoned debate, tolerance 
and solidarity – essential principles for viable public life in today’s globalised and multi-
cultural societies” (Waisboard, 2018, p. 2). According to this interpretation, “the kind of 
post-truth politics represented by populism thrives in the current conditions of public 
communication” (2018). From this perspective: 
Post-truth captures new conditions for public communication that signal the 
impossibility of truth as shared assessments about reality. ‘Post-truth’ should 
not be confused with deliberate distortion, fake news, and alternative facts – 
that is, with the intentional production of falsehoods to deceive public […]. 
Instead, ‘post-truth’ communication denotes the absence of conditions in the 
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public sphere for citizens to concur on objectives and processual norms to de-
termine the truth as verifiable statements about reality. Recent developments 
have deepened the obstacles for truth-telling and revealed social and commu-
nicative rifts that foster post-truth politics. […]. Post-truth implies the levelling 
of opportunities for making any statements about reality that can potentially 
be deemed credible. The modernist notion that truth is determined by the con-
vention of the scientific paradigm or by intersubjective agreement over norms 
clashes with the ample circulation of widespread fact-less beliefs popularly con-
sidered to be accurate representation of reality (2018, pp.3-4). 
In other words, post-truth political communication pertains to a structural and 
functional transformation of the conditions of public debate within the public sphere. 
Since the Habermasian theory of communicative action has been established in polit-
ical theory, the historical and theoretical analysis of the ‘public sphere’ emphasised the 
centrality of the ‘cognitive’ and moral premises of this cultural and societal space: the 
claims of validity, truth, correctness and sincerity are the building blocks of this ‘moral’ 
and ‘cognitive’ construction. 
On the normative ground, solidarity between strangers, an attitude shared by private 
individuals who gather as a ‘public’ in order to care about public affairs, who still maintain 
different opinions while debating them, being able, at the end of a ‘deliberative process’, to 
achieve a common understanding, whenever the ‘normative’ force of the ‘better argument’ 
posed on a rational and ‘moral’ level, may prevail. In this sense, the normative conditions7 
of the public sphere in democratic regimes draw on the fact that “the prerequisite for any 
functional public sphere is that all citizens must be given equal access to it, and they must 
have freedom to express their opinions publicly and without restraint on matters of public 
interest” (Demata, 2016, p. 85). The characterising features of contemporary social media 
are so diversified that it is impossible to draw general conclusions on the nature of political 
discussion on the Internet. Therefore, it is worth noticing that “while the availability of 
technology is not in itself the cause of political discussion, it should be said that technolo-
gy may facilitate (or impede) discussion and deliberation” (2016, p. 86). 
7 The concept of the ‘ideal speech situation’ in the Habermasian theory of action has been repeatedly contested in the 
theoretical debate and within critical theory. It is thus of particular interest the differing position of Foucault as far as the 
‘argumentation as a practice of critique’. In this sense, for Foucault it is possible to think of communication (and commu-
nicative action) as a possible strategy of criticism and struggle that may be privileged, but not utopistically substituted for 
other strategies, while ‘power’ is hardly divisible in different contexts by different regimes of ‘truth’ and knowledge; see 
Sorrentino (2008). 
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Thus, social networks affect the public sphere in both its structure and function-
ing. The abstract public sphere, namely the more ample and inclusive dimension of 
the Habermasian construction (Habermas, 1992), along with its “organized” intermedi-
ate level are changing profoundly8. Algorithms and internet profiles of Web navigators 
and ‘customers’ are key in the construction of what we can call the individual prefer-
ence-laden communication system. Within so-called “echo-chambers” a “community” 
of internet navigators share the same views, convey the same preferences, share and 
deem true the same stories, transforming a free and innumerable ‘swarm’ (namely free 
people on the web) into a broad beehive with ‘individualised’ closed cells. This frame-
work then ends up reducing and/or excluding room for manoeuvre for the formation 
of an open, broad, multiple, even conflicting confrontation between ‘different’ opinions 
and views. The post-truth communication regime seems, therefore, to unfold between 
the proliferation of fake news, that is the case in point in this new communication style, 
on the one hand, and the erosion of the very same condition to maintain the pluralistic, 
contested, complex, contentious construction of public opinion, on the other (Demata, 
2016; Ferraris, 2017). 
Post-Truth at Issue: Definitions and Problems 
The elective affinity between populism and post-truth, namely the radicalised and 
fragmented regime of truth within a mutated public sphere via the impact of new me-
dia, emerges since the political communication style of politicians has changed pro-
foundly. According to Demata in particular,
By using SNSs, politicians can plug into our lives and approach us directly: most 
of them have Facebook pages or Twitter accounts, communicate with us in often 
familiar language, and are keen to be seen doing domestic, everyday activities. 
[…] The appearance of interacting with the people is more important than actual 
interaction, which is virtually non-existent […]. While the technology gives us 
the impression (and the possibility) of a two-way communication, the reality is 
that most politicians are not interested in opening a true dialogue and in listening 
8 Actually, in his theoretical and historical analysis of the public sphere Habermas had thematised the challenges that the 
market economy and the mediatization of public opinion had launched to the normative basis and functions of the public 
sphere within representative democracies.
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to ideas from their constituents, but only in mobilizing them around some new 
initiative or message (Demata, 2016, p. 85). 
In this framework, (neo)-populism as a political style, or as a ‘thin’9 ideology, con-
sists of “an appeal to ‘the people’ versus the ‘elite’, ‘bad manners’ and the performance of 
the crisis, breakdown or threat”(Moffit, 2016). In this vein, it can also be conceived as a 
gradational concept, with different shades, a sort of ‘grey area’ wherein it is possible to 
see how “the degree of populism that a given political actor employs may vary across 
contexts and over time” (2016, p.46). According to scholars, it is possible to conceptual-
ise populism also with respect to the role of populist leaders as performers of this par-
ticular political style, whilst the relationship between populism and the media entails 
different articulations. Thus, 
[the populist] appeal to ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’ […] plays into media log-
ic’s dramatization, polarisation and prioritisation of conflict; […] ‘bad manners’ 
line up with media logic’s personalisation, stereotypisation and emotionalization, 
while [the ] focus on crisis plays into media logic’s tendency towards intensifica-
tion and simplification. In this situation, populism can thus potentially be consid-
ered the media-political form par excellence at this particular historical juncture. 
This might help explain why populism currently seems to be more widespread 
and successful across the globe than any other time in its history (2016, p.77). 
Further considerations can be drawn concerning the structural conditions of po-
litical communication as they emerge within the new media environment. Scholars 
consider the paradox according to which, whilst the new media revolution has hugely 
increased the opportunity for expression of multiple voices, it is also creating the 
conditions for post-truth. The access threshold to this sphere of communication has 
been lowered, while at the same time conditions for misinformation campaigns and 
the circulation of lies have been created as well (Waisbord, 2018). Thus, numerous 
elements have to be considered: deception and manipulation of the public, the spread 
of fake news, the construction of false profiles on Facebook, the cyber-troops of ‘bots’ 
and ‘chatbots’, internet programs which simulate users, build filter bubbles, mecha-
nisms of control of users and data profiling. These new structural conditions also pose 
9 This is the topical definition of populism coined by one of the most influential scholars on the subject, namely Cas Mudde 
(2004). 
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the question of government manipulation and control, the influence of the market 
and the conditions that allow free expression and the commitment to form ‘public 
opinion’. Scholars develop not only political but also epistemological considerations 
on what can be considered the new ‘regime of truth’ (D’Ancona, 2017). A regime in 
which “transparency” (Pinto, 2013) undermines responsibility, the extraction and/or 
the exhibition of private information weakens rational commitment in public discus-
sions, whilst a new technological panopticon exercises new forms of control. 
According to Oxford Dictionaries, post-truth is a concept that relates to or denotes 
“circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion 
than appeals to emotion and personal belief ” (Lorusso, 2018, p. 4). According to schol-
ars, post-truth can be regarded as a semiotic dimension of public discourse, namely as 
the result of a set of practices for the ‘social construction’ of truth deeply transformed by 
the impact of social media. In history, within different ‘epistemes’, in the Foucauldian10 
sense, diverse combinations of ‘power and knowledge’ have built the cultural practices 
which establish the social dimensions of trust and truth. Different accounts of this new 
regime of truth, namely post-truth, vary in their scope and meaning. Some analyti-
cal reconstructions thematise the concept of post-truth and put it on the level of crit-
ical philosophical stances pertaining to epistemological, ontological, methodological 
configuration of the contemporary ‘episteme’11. Thus, post-modernity12, the demise of 
“meta-recits”, according to the Lyotard dictum, along with the critique of the structural 
nexus between power and knowledge (according to which any account of reality cannot 
exist if not entangled with power), are all component parts of the critical reasoning on 
post-truth (Ferraris, 2017).
Other explanations, which do not merely draw on the new media impact on the 
regime of (post)-truth, find broader approaches to the analysis, confronting societal 
and epistemic transformations. In this sense, the contemporary post-truth condition 
is produced by a broader ‘revolution’ involving technology, society, culture. From this 
perspective, according in particular to Ferrarsis (2017), the concept of “documediality” 
identifies the new stage in the evolution of capitalism in that it determines the new 
conditions of the structural relations between knowledge and power within societies. 
10 See the bibliographic review on Foucauldian works on the topic of the nexus of power and knowledge in various histo-
rical periods, pertaining to the epistemological and ontological dimensions of social life, in Bernini (2008). 
11 See note 52. 
12 An illuminating reflection has been developed by Alessandro Ferrara who distinguished postmodernity as a shared 
hermeneutic and ontological horizon characterised by diversity, epistemological and cultural pluralism and postmodern 
philosophical doctrines, which nurture relativistic orientations; see A. Ferrara (2015). 
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Virality and interconnectivity, the de-temporalisation of facts and events in the ‘world-
wide web’, mystification and manipulation of contents, the fragmentation of broadcast-
ing and multimediality and their complex interactions, all shape the configuration of 
the new epistemic regime of post-truth. 
In this context, the impact of new media in the construction of the public sphere, 
which is in modelling both perceptions and the processes of social construction of reali-
ty, within the fragmented communities of social networks, is an integral part of this new 
‘human condition’. The proliferation of fake news, the recursive dynamics of storytelling 
and echo chambers characterize what has been identified as a ‘post-factual democracy’ 
in which collective agreements on the construction of societal reality and its meaning, 
are profoundly challenged and contended. 
Knowledge, Representative Democracy and Trust: Some 
Meta-Reflection
Whereas democratic theory in recent decades has focused on the critique of the 
rationalistic and elitist, technocratic and epistemic degeneration of contemporary rep-
resentative democracies (Mouffe, 2005; Pellizzoni, 2005), actually a sort of emotional 
and irrational wave within the ‘neo-populist storm’ has been unfolding13. At the same 
time, the development of social networks and the ‘digitalisation’ of everyday life, para-
doxically, have not injected a further amount of rationality in the political ‘circuits’ of 
representative democracy, having fostered instead new forms of political manipulation. 
In particular, Nadia Urbinati (Urbinati, 2014) has analysed both the populist-dem-
agogic and plebiscitarian challenges to political representation, along with the techno-
cratic pitfalls of an epistemic view of representative democracies in complex societies. 
From this perspective, Urbinati defends the idea of procedural democracy and consid-
ers this kind of political regime as based on a diarchic structure constituted by both 
will and judgement, the former being expressed through elections, the latter unfolding 
within the flux of public opinion. 
13 It is worth noticing that recent strands of critical reflections in both political theory and sociology come to grips with 
the question of emotions in politics in order to overcome a strict separation if not contradiction between rationality and 
emotions, also considered as a negative legacy of modernity since it separated passions and rational orientation in politics; 
on this topic among others see J. Goodwin, J, M. Jasper and F. Polletta (eds) (2001) and Mouffe (2002), Politics and Passions, 
Centre for the Study of Democracy, pp. 1-16.
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Accordingly, the populistic challenge threatens this diarchy trying to overcome any 
intermediation between will and judgement, between leaders and the people, whilst ple-
biscitarianism tries also to control and manipulate the public sphere transforming active 
citizens into passive spectators. At the same time, the epistemic-technocratic challenge to 
the democratic regimes embodies a manifestation of the “guardian democracy” wherein 
experts’ knowledge marginalises other forms of knowledge undervaluing the impact of 
public opinion on the decisional processes within the representative institutions. Thus, 
the diarchic nature of representative democracy, namely the balance between will and 
judgement, the moment of decision and the expression of public opinion and knowledge 
(since the ‘truth’ of representative democracy is its ‘procedure’), is has been brought into 
question by both populism and plebiscitarianism. As Urbinati maintains, 
Democracy is a combination of decisions and judgement on decisions: devising 
proposals and deciding on them (or those who are going to carry them out) ac-
cording to majority rule. The character of democracy is diarchic and its nature 
procedural. […]. To go a step further, we may say that democratic proceduralism 
is in the service of equal political liberty since it presumes and claims the equal 
right and opportunity citizens have to participate in the formation of the majority 
view with their individual votes and their opinion, it is what qualifies democracy 
as a form of government whose citizens obey the laws they contribute in making, 
directly or indirectly (2014, pp.2018-2019).14 
The figure of representative democracy is then diarchic in the sense illustrated 
above; epistemic democracy, populism, plebiscitarian claims, all contest and contend 
to proceduralism its normative and institutional endowments. Thus, whilst “epistemic 
democracy” entails objective ‘standards’ to evaluate collective choices and decisions, 
regarded as more demanding criteria (since public opinion and popular judgement is 
considered as not safe enough from ignorance), symmetrically the populist ‘assault’ on 
public opinion is devoted to controlling and manipulating it, for the sake of leaders who 
appeal to – and manipulate – people as the preserve of democratic sovereignty. As Urbi-
nati specifies, “populism is a call for concentration of voice and power, will and opinion, 
and to overcome diarchy by blurring the border that keeps the people and the state, the 
opinion and the will, separate although in communication” (2014, p.157). 
14 Ivi, pp. 18-19; regarding the real opportunities to participate in decisional processes, the problem of effectivity of citi-
zens’ rights has emerged in the theoretical debate, as Urbinati also maintains in Urbinati (2013). 
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In its turn, whilst populism “gives the People a political presence”, plebiscitarian 
disfiguration of democracy gives it a passive role that mainly consists in watching 
leaders in the public sphere, where politics becomes a show, a public exhibition of 
private virtues instead of a public space where accountable political leaders are ex-
pected to respond to citizens’ demands. Thus, while democratic proceduralism in-
vokes participation, plebiscitarian democracy “wants transparency” (2014, p.172). 
In this sense, the plebiscitarian view seeks to substitute accountability and pro-
cedures with an aesthetic, theatrical, spectacularized configuration of the public 
sphere. That is exactly where the like-dislike mechanism, the overload of images 
and the ‘exhibition’ of leaders on the web, in social networks and their day-to-day 
functioning, moving to. 
Thus, in attributing value and credibility to the configuration of democracy as a 
diarchic construction of will and judgement within procedures and institutions, what is 
needed is also to reflect on the transformations that new media are producing in polit-
ical culture and the public sphere. Re-balancing the two components of representative 
democracy in this new context seems to be the greatest challenge we have to face in the 
years to come, in unpredictable ways that have not been experimented yet15. 
Concluding Remarks 
These final reflections provide the opportunity to synthetize the different elements 
covered in this analytical overview. Thus, going back over them allows us to observe 
how the neo-populist waves in the age of post-democracy have revealed the breakdown 
of the ‘constitutive pact’ of representative democracy. The sovereignty of the people ar-
ticulated within representative institutions has entered a period of deep crisis. In this 
sense, contemporary neo-populist waves can also be regarded as the expression of social 
diseases, a reaction to anti-popular economic policies and to an elitist, technocratic 
and (un)democratic drift, (Anselmi, 2017; D’Eramo, 2013; Revelli, 2017) but also as the 
manifestation of this void in representation. 
New institutional settings are then to be found, since the political representation de-
vice that achieved the democratic balance between various social and political subjects 
15 However, in the 1960s, demands aimed at enlarging participation and citizens’ rights, overcoming the limits of the repre-
sentative formula, had been proposed, long before the watershed event of the neo-populist wave diverted the ‘sense’ of these 
claims; see D. Held (1997), Modelli di democrazia, cit.; and Hardt M., Negri A. (2004), Moltitudine. Guerra e democrazia nel 
nuovo ordine imperiale, Rizzoli, Milano.
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constituting the sovereign people in the XX century Fordist-Keynesian democracies no 
longer works the same way.
Thus, whilst during the 1970s social movements were giving voice to ‘progressive’ 
anti-representative demands to promote direct and deeper participation in democratic 
decisional processes (Bazzicalupo, 2014; Held, 1995) nowadays manifestations of dis-
trust, discontent, opposition are instrumentalised by ‘populist’ leaders, namely the XXI 
century demagogues who exploit new media to magnify the manipulative effects of new 
forms of communication, whilst the emergent ‘progressive’ and ‘proactive’ social move-
ments appear to be in the minority, within the spectacularized public sphere. 
Thus, new media contribute to ‘disintermediating’ politics, bringing into question 
the organizational dimension of politics, which had been considered the preserve of po-
litical consciousness and popular influence during the ‘ideological’ Nineteenth Century 
(Prospero, 2018). In this sense, neo-populist political style intersects the new ontology 
of our time, namely “documediality” consisting in new technologies and algorithms, 
which constitute the building blocks of contemporary capitalistic and epistemic ‘struc-
ture’ of societies. In this context, the question of post-truth has emerged, ranging from 
‘the critique of the scepticism of postmodern critique’ (in a sort of counter-movement 
within the theoretical debate moving from modernity to post-modernity, and from the 
latter to reflexive modernity (Ferraris, 2017) and beyond), to political communication 
studies which highlight how social networks, bio-hypermedia, platform capitalism are 
exerting their influence on contemporary democracies (Gambetta, 2018; Waisbord, 
2018). Within this complex and contradictory scenario, a new problematic page of the 
history of democracy is currently being written. 
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